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In this paper, we study the unconditional security of the so-called measurement device independent
quantum key distribution (MDIQKD) with the basis-dependent flaw in the context of phase encoding
schemes. We propose two schemes for the phase encoding, the first one employs a phase locking
technique with the use of non-phase-randomized coherent pulses, and the second one uses conversion
of standard BB84 phase encoding pulses into polarization modes. We prove the unconditional
security of these schemes and we also simulate the key generation rate based on simple device
models that accommodate imperfections. Our simulation results show the feasibility of these schemes
with current technologies and highlight the importance of the state preparation with good fidelity
between the density matrices in the two bases. Since the basis-dependent flaw is a problem not only
for MDIQKD but also for standard QKD, our work highlights the importance of an accurate signal
source in practical QKD systems.
Note: We include the erratum of this paper in Appendix C. The correction does
not affect the validity of the main conclusions reported in the paper, which is the
importance of the state preparation in MDIQKD and the fact that our schemes can
generate the key with the practical channel mode that we have assumed.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is often said to be
unconditionally secure [1–3]. More precisely, QKD can
be proven to be secure against any eavesdropping given
that the users’ (Alice and Bob) devices satisfy some re-
quirements, which often include mathematical character-
ization of users’ devices as well as the assumption that
there is no side-channel. This means that no one can
break mathematical model of QKD, however in practice,
it is very difficult for practical devices to meet the require-
ments, leading to the breakage of the security of practical
QKD systems. Actually, some attacks on QKD have been
proposed and demonstrated successfully against practical
QKD systems [4, 5].
To combat the practical attacks, some counter-
measures [6], including device independent security proof
idea [7], have been proposed. The device independent se-
curity proof is very interesting from the theoretical view-
point, however it cannot apply to practical QKD systems
where loopholes in testing Bell’s inequality [8] cannot be
closed. As for the experimental counter-measures, battle-
testing of the practical detection unit has attracted many
researchers’ attention [5] since the most successful prac-
tical attack so far is to exploit the imperfections of the
detectors.
Recently, a very simple and very promising idea,
which is called a measurement device independent QKD
(MDIQKD) has been proposed by Lo, Curty, and Qi [9].
In this scheme, neither Alice nor Bob performs any mea-
surement, but they only send out quantum signals to a
measurement unit (MU). MU is a willing participant of
the protocol, and MU can be a network administrator or
a relay. However, MU can be untrusted and completely
under the control of the eavesdropper (Eve). After Al-
ice and Bob send out signals, they wait for MU’s an-
nouncement of whether she has obtained the successful
detection, and proceed to the standard post-processing
of their sifted data, such as error rate estimation, er-
ror correction, and privacy amplification. The basic idea
of MDIQKD is based on a reversed EPR-based QKD
protocol [10], which is equivalent to EPR-based QKD
[11] in the sense of the security, and MDIQKD is re-
markable because it removes all the potential loopholes
of the detectors without sacrificing the performance of
standard QKD since Alice and Bob do not detect any
quantum signals from Eve. Moreover, it is shown in [9]
that MDIQKD with infinite number of decoy states and
2polarization encoding can cover about twice the distance
of standard decoyed QKD, which is comparable to EPR-
based QKD. The only assumption needed in MDIQKD
is that the preparation of the quantum signal sources by
Alice and Bob is (almost) perfect and carefully character-
ized. We remark that the characterization of the signal
source should be easier than that of the detection unit
since the characterization of the detection unit involves
the estimation of the response of the devices to unknown
input signals sent from Eve.
With MDIQKD in our hand, we do not need to worry
about imperfections of MU any more, and we should
focus our attention more to the imperfections of sig-
nal sources. One of the important imperfections of the
sources is the basis-dependent flaw that stems from the
discrepancy of the density matrices corresponding to the
two bases in BB84 states. The security of standard BB84
with basis-dependent flaw has been analyzed in [12–14]
which show that the basis-dependent flaw decreases the
achievable distance. Thus, in order to investigate the
practicality of MDIQKD, we need to generalize the above
works to investigate the security of MDIQKD under the
imperfection. Another problem in MDIQKD is that the
first proposal is based on polarization encoding [9], how-
ever, in some situations where birefringence effect in op-
tical fiber is highly time-dependent, we need to consider
MDIQKD with phase encoding rather than polarization
encoding. In this paper, we study the above issues simul-
taneously.
We first propose two schemes of the phase encoding
MDIQKD, one employs phase locking of two separate
laser sources and the other one uses the conversion of
phase encoding into polarization encoding. Then, we
prove the unconditional security of these schemes with
basis-dependent flaw by generalizing the quantum coin
idea [12–14]. Based on the security proof, we simulate
the key generation rate with realistic parameters, espe-
cially we employ a simple model to evaluate the basis-
dependent flaw due to the imperfection of the phase
modulators. Our simulation results imply that the first
scheme covers shorter distances and may require less ac-
curacy of the state preparation, while the second scheme
can cover much longer distances when we can prepare the
state very precisely. We note that in this paper we con-
sider the most general type of attacks allowed by quan-
tum mechanics and establish unconditional security for
our protocols.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we give a
generic description of MDIQKD protocol, and we propose
our schemes in Sec. III and Sec. IV. Then, we prove the
unconditional security of our schemes in Sec. V, and
we present some simulation results of the key generation
rate based on realistic parameters in Sec. VI. Finally, we
summarize this paper in Sec. VII.
II. PROTOCOL
In this section, we introduce MDIQKD protocol whose
description is generic for all the schemes that we will in-
troduce in the following sections. The MDIQKD protocol
runs as follows.
Step (1): Each of Alice and Bob prepares a signal pulse
and a reference pulse, and each of Alice and Bob ap-
plies phase modulation to the signal pulse, which is ran-
domly chosen from 0, π/2, π, and 3π/2. Here, {0, π}
({π/2, 3π/2}) defines X (Y )-basis. Alice and Bob send
both pulses through quantum channels to Eve who pos-
sesses MU.
Step (2): MU performs some measurement, and an-
nounces whether the measurement outcome is successful
or not. It also broadcasts whether the successful event is
the detection of type-0 or type-1 (The two types of the
successful outcomes correspond to two specific Bell states
[15]).
Step (3): If the measurement outcome is successful,
then Alice and Bob keep their data. Otherwise, they dis-
card the data. When the outcome is successful, Alice and
Bob broadcast their bases and they keep the data only
when the bases match, which we call sifted key. Depend-
ing on the type of the successful event and the basis that
they used, Bob may or may not perform bit-flip on his
sifted key.
Step (4): Alice and Bob repeat (1)-(3) many times
until they have large enough number of the sifted key.
Step (5): They sacrifice a portion of the data as the
test bits to estimate the bit error rate and the phase error
rate on the remaining data (code bits).
Step (6): If the estimated bit error and phase error
rates are too high, then they abort the protocol, other-
wise they proceed.
Step (7): Alice and Bob agree over a public channel
on an error correcting code and on a hash function de-
pending on the bit and phase error rate on the code bits.
After performing error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion, they share the key.
The role of the MU in Eve is to establish a quantum
correlation, i.e., a Bell state, between Alice and Bob to
generate the key. If it can establish the strong correla-
tion, then Alice and Bob can generate the key, and if it
cannot, then it only results in a high bit error rate to
be detected by Alice and Bob and they abort the proto-
col. As we will see later, since Alice and Bob can judge
whether they can generate a key or not by only check-
ing the experimental data as well as information on the
fidelity between the density matrices in X- basis and Y -
basis, it does not matter who performs the measurement
nor what kind of measurement is actually done as long as
MU broadcasts whether the measurement outcome was
successful together with the information of whether the
successful outcome is type-0 or type-1.
In the security proof, we assume that MU is totally
under the control of Eve. In practice, however, we should
choose an appropriate measurement that establishes the
3strong correlation under the normal operation, i.e., the
situation without Eve who induces the channel losses and
noises. In the following sections, we will propose two
phase encoding MDIQKD schemes.
III. PHASE ENCODING SCHEME I
In this section, we propose an experimental setup for
MDIQKD with phase encoding scheme, which is depicted
in Fig. 1. This scheme will be proven to be uncondition-
ally secure, i.e., secure against the most general type of
attacks allowed by quantum mechanics. In this setup,
we assume that the intensity of Alice’s signal (reference)
pulse matches with that of Bob’s signal (reference) pulse
when they enter MU. In order to lock the relative phase,
we use strong pulses as the reference pulses. In PL unit
in the figure, the relative phase between the two strong
pulses is measured in two polarization modes separately.
The measurement result is denoted by ~κ (here, the arrow
represents two entries that correspond to the two relative
phases). Depending on this information ~κ, appropriate
phase modulations for two polarization modes are ap-
plied to incoming signal pulse from Alice. Then, Alice’s
and Bob’s signal pulses are input into the 50/50 beam
splitter which is followed by two single-photon threshold
detectors. The successful event of type-0 (type-1) in step
(2) is defined as the event where only D0 (D1) clicks. In
the case of type-1 successful detection event, Bob applies
bit flip to his sifted key (we define the phase relationship
of BS in such a way that D1 never clicks when the phases
of the two input signal coherent pulses are the same).
Roughly speaking, our scheme performs double BB84
[16], i.e., each of Alice and Bob is sending signals in the
BB84 states, without phase randomization [14]. Differ-
ences between our scheme and the polarization encod-
ing MDIQKD scheme include that Alice and Bob do not
need to share the reference frame for the polarization
mode, since MU performs the feed-forward control of the
polarization, and our scheme intrinsically possesses the
basis-dependent flaw.
To see how this particular setup establishes the quan-
tum correlation under the normal operation, it is con-
venient to consider an entanglement distribution scheme
[17], which is mathematically equivalent to the actual
protocol. For the simplicity of the discussion, we assume
the perfect phase locking for the moment and we only
consider the case where both of Alice and Bob use X-
basis. We skip the discussion for Y -basis, however it
holds in a similar manner [18]. In this case, the actual
protocol is equivalently described as follows. First, Alice
prepares two systems in the following state, which is a
purification of the X-basis density matrix,
∣∣∣φ(+)x (|√αA〉)
〉
≡ 1√
2
(
|0x〉A1
∣∣√αA〉A2
+ |1x〉A1 |−
√
αA〉A2
)
(1)
Alice Bob
Las
er Laser
A-S
OS
BS
D1D0
A-R B-S
B-R
PL
OS
FIG. 1: Schematics of an experimental setup for the phase
encoding scheme I. A-S (B-S) and A-R (B-R) respectively
represents Alice’s (Bob’s) signal and reference pulses. The
signal pulses are phase modulated according to Alice’s and
Bob’s choice. OS represents an optical switch, which allows
the reference pulse and the signal pulse to be transmitted and
to be reflected, respectively. PL represents an unit measuring
relative phase of two orthogonal polarization modes and it
outputs the two relative phase information ~κ. Then, the phase
shift of ~κ for each polarization mode is applied to one of the
signal pulses, and they will be detected by D0 and D1 after
the interference at the 50:50 beam splitter BS.
and sends the second system to MU through the quan-
tum channel. Here,
∣∣√αA〉A2 and
∣∣−√αA〉A2 represent
coherent states that Alice prepares in the actual protocol
(αA represents the mean photon number or inetensity),
|0x〉 and |1x〉 are eigenstate of the computational basis (X
basis), which is related with Y -basis eigenstate through
|0y〉 ≡ (i |0x〉 + |1x〉)/
√
2 and |1y〉 ≡ (|0x〉 + i |1x〉)/
√
2.
For the later convenience, we also define Z-basis states
as |0z〉 ≡ (|0x〉 + |1x〉)/
√
2 and |1z〉 ≡ (|0x〉 − |1x〉)/
√
2.
Moreover, the subscript of x in
∣∣∣φ(+)x (∣∣√αA〉)
〉
represents
that Alice is to measure her qubit alongX-basis, the sub-
script of A in αA refers to the party who prepares the
system, and the superscript (+) represents the relative
phase of the superposition. Similarly, Bob also prepares
two systems in a similar state
∣∣∣φ(+)x (∣∣√αB〉)
〉
, sends the
second system to MU, and performs X-basis measure-
ment. Note that X-basis measurement by Alice and Bob
can be delayed after Eve’s announcement of the success-
ful event without losing any generalities in the security
analysis, and we assume this delay in what follows.
In order to see the joint state of the qubit pair after the
announcement, note that the beam splitter converts the
joint state
∣∣∣φ(+)x (∣∣√αA〉)
〉 ∣∣∣φ(+)x (∣∣√αB〉)
〉
into the follow-
4ing state |ζ〉A1,B1,D0,D1
|ζ〉A1,B1,D0,D1 ≡
1
2
(
|0x〉A1 |0x〉B1
∣∣∣√2α′〉
D0
|0〉D1
+ |1x〉A1 |1x〉B1
∣∣∣−√2α′〉
D0
|0〉D1
+ |0x〉A1 |1x〉B1 |0〉D0
∣∣∣√2α′〉
D1
+ |1x〉A1 |0x〉B1 |0〉D0
∣∣∣−√2α′〉
D1
)
.
(2)
Here, for the simplicity of the discussion, we assume that
there is no channel losses, we define αA = αB ≡ α′, and
|0〉 represents the vacuum state. Moreover, the subscripts
D0 and D1 represent the output ports of the beam split-
ter. If detector D0 (D1) detects photons and the other
detector D1 (D0) detects the vacuum state, i.e., type-
0 (type-1) event, it is shown in the Appendix A that
the joint probability of having type-0 (type-1) successful
event and Alice and Bob share the maximally entangled
state |Ψ+〉 (|Ψ−〉) is (1 − e−4α′)/4. We note that since∣∣∣√2α′〉 6=
∣∣∣−√2α′〉, Alice and Bob do not always share
this state, and with a joint probability of (1− e−2α′)2/4,
they have type-0 (type-1) successful event and share the
maximally entangled state with the phase error, i.e., the
bit error in Y -basis, as |Φ+〉 (|Φ−〉).
Note that the bit-flip operation in type-1 successful
detection can be equivalently performed by π rotation
around Z-basis before Bob performs X basis measure-
ment. In other words, π rotation around Z-basis be-
fore X-basis measurement does not change the statis-
tics of the X-basis measurement followed by the bit-flip.
Thanks to this property, we can conclude that Alice and
Bob share |Ψ+〉 with probability of (1−e−4α′)/2 and |Φ+〉
with probability of (1−e−2α′)2/2 after the rotation. This
means that even if Alice and Bob are given the successful
detection event, they cannot be sure whether they share
|Φ+〉 or |Ψ+〉, however, if they choose a small enough α,
then the phase error rate (the rate of the state |Φ+〉 in
the qubit pairs remaining after the successful events or
equivalently, the rate of Y -basis bit error among all the
shared qubit pairs) becomes small and they can gener-
ate a pure state |Ψ+〉 by phase error correction, which is
equivalently done by privacy amplification in the actual
protocol [3]. We note that the above discussion is valid
only for the case without noises and losses, and we will
prove the security against the most general attack in Sec.
V without relying on the argument given in this section.
We remark that in the phase encoding scheme I, it is
important that Alice and Bob know quite well about the
four states that they prepare. This may be accomplished
by using state tomography with homodyne measurement
involving the use of the strong reference pulse [19].
IV. PHASE ENCODING SCHEME II
In this section, we propose the second experimen-
tal setup for MDIQKD with phase encoding scheme.
Like scheme I, this scheme will also be proven to be
unconditionally secure. In this scheme, the coherent
pulses that Alice and Bob send out are exactly the
same as those in the standard phase encoding BB84, i.e.,∣∣ei(ζ+θ)√α〉
s
∣∣eiζ√α〉
r
where subscripts s and r respec-
tively denote the signal pulse and the reference pulse,
ζ is a completely random phase, θ is randomly chosen
from {0, π/2, π, 3π/2} to encode the information. After
entering the MU, each pulse pair is converted from a
phase coding signal to a polarization coding signal by a
phase-to-polarization converter (see details below). We
note that thanks to the phase randomization by ζ, the
joint state of the signal pulse and the reference pulse is
a classical mixture of photon number states.
In Fig. 2, we show the schematics of the converter.
This converter performs the phase-to-polarization con-
version: Pˆ1
∣∣ei(ζ+θ)√α〉
s
∣∣eiζ√α〉
r
to (|V 〉+ eiθ |H〉)/√2,
where Pˆ1 is a projector that projects the joint system
of the signal and reference pulses to a two-dimensional
single-photon subspace spanned by {|0〉s |1〉r , |1〉s |0〉r}
where 0 and 1 represent the photon number, and |H〉
(|V 〉) represents the horizontal (vertical) polarization
state of a single-photon. To see how it works, let us
follow the time evolution of the input state. At the po-
larization beam splitter (PBS in Fig. 2), the signal and
reference pulses first split into two polarization modes,
H and V, and we throw away the pulses being routed
to V mode. Then, in H mode, the signal pulse and the
reference pulse are routed to different paths by using an
optical switch, and we apply π-rotation only to one of
the paths to convert H to V. At this point, we essen-
tially have (|V 〉up + eiθ |H〉lw)/
√
2, where the subscripts
of “up” and “lw” respectively denote the upper path and
the lower path. Finally, these spatial modes up and lw
are combined together by using a polarization beam split-
ter so that we have (|V 〉+eiθ |H〉)/√2 in the output port
depicted as “OUT”.
In practice, since the birefringence of the quantum
channel can be highly time dependent and the polar-
ization state of the input pulses to MU may randomly
change with time, i.e., the input polarization state is a
completely mixed state, we cannot deterministically dis-
till a pure polarization state, and thus the conversion
efficiency can never be perfect. In other words, one may
consider the same conversion of the V mode just after
the first polarization beam splitter, however it is impos-
sible to combine the resulting polarization pulses from V
mode and the one from H mode into a single mode.
We assume that MU has two converters, one is for
the conversion of Alice’s pulse and the other one is for
Bob’s pulse, and the two output ports “OUT” are con-
nected to exactly the same Bell measurement unit [8]
in the polarization encoding MDIQKD scheme in Fig.
3 [9]. This Bell measurement unit consists of a 50:50
5OS PBS
PBS
H
V
s r V
HV
OUT
+
FIG. 2: Schematics of an experimental setup of the converter from phase encoding to polarization encoding. PBS is a
polarization beam splitter, OS represents an optical switch that routes the reference pulse and signal pulses to different paths.
The “π” performs the conversion |H〉 → |V 〉. The circle represents time-delay. The italic characters along the lines represent
the polarization state.
Alice
A-S
BS
D0
+
A-R
Co
nv
B-S
B-R
Conv
PBS PBS
D1
+D0
-
D1
-
Bob
FIG. 3: Schematics of an experimental setup of MU. A-S (B-S) and A-R (B-R) respectively represent Alice’s (Bob’s) signal
and reference pulses, and MU consists of two converters for each pulse from Alice and Bob (depicted as “Conv”), and Bell
measurement unit consists of a 50:50 beam splitter (BS) followed by two polarization beam splitters (PBSs). See the main text
for the explanation.
beam splitter, two polarization beam splitters, and four
single-photon detectors, which only distinguishes per-
fectly two out of the four Bell states of |Φ−〉 and |Ψ−〉.
The polarization beam splitters discriminate between
|+〉 ≡ (|H〉 + |V 〉)/√2 and |−〉 ≡ (|H〉 − |V 〉)/√2 (note
that we choose + and − modes rather than H and V
modes since our computational basis is + and −). Sup-
pose that a single-photon enters both from Alice and
Bob. In this case, the click of D0+ and D0- or D1+
and D1- means the detection of |Φ−〉, and the click of
D0+ and D1- or D0- and D1+ means the detection of
|Ψ−〉 (see Fig. 3). In this scheme, since the use of co-
herent light induces non-zero bit error rate in Y -basis
({(|H〉+ i |V 〉)/√2, (|H〉− i |V 〉)/√2}-basis), we consider
to generate the key from {|+〉 , |−〉}-basis and we use the
data in Y -basis only to estimate the bit error rate in this
basis conditioned on that both of Alice and Bob emit a
single-photon, which determines the amount of privacy
amplification. By considering a single-photon polariza-
tion input both from Alice and Bob, one can see that
Bob should not apply the bit flip only when Alice and
Bob use Y -basis and Φ− is detected in MU, and Bob
should apply the bit flip in all the other successful events
to share the same bit value. Accordingly, the bit error in
X-basis is given by the successful detection event condi-
tioned on that Alice and Bob’s polarization are identical.
As for Y -basis, the bit error is Φ− detection given the
orthogonal polarizations or Ψ− detection given the iden-
tical polarization.
Assuming completely random input polarization state,
our converter successfully converts the single-photon
pulse with a probability of 50%. Note in the normal
experiment that the birefringence effect between Alice
and the converter and the one between Bob and the con-
verter are random and independent, however it only leads
to fluctuating coincidence rate of Alice’s and Bob’s sig-
nals at the Bell measurement, but does not affect the
QBER. Moreover, the fluctuation increases the single-
photon loss inserted into the Bell measurement. Espe-
cially, the events that the output of the converter for Al-
ice is the vacuum and the one for Bob is a single-photon,
and vice versa would increase compared to the case where
we have no birefringence effect. However, this is not a
problem since the Bell measurement does not output the
conclusive events in these cases unless the dark counting
occurs. Thus, the random and independent polarization
fluctuation in the normal experiment is not a problem,
and we will simply assume in our simulation in Sec. VIB
6that this fluctuation can be modeled just by 50% loss.
We emphasize that we do not rely on these assumptions
at all when we prove the security, and our security proof
applies to any channels and MUs.
For the better performance and also for the simplicity
of analysis, we assume the use of infinite number of decoy
states [20] to estimate the fraction of the probability of
successful event conditioned on that both of Alice and
Bob emit a single-photon. One of the differences in our
analysis from the work in [9] is that we will take into
account the imperfection of Alice’s and Bob’s source, i.e.,
the decay of the fidelity between two density matrices
in two bases. We also remark that since the H and V
modes are defined locally in MU, Alice and Bob do not
need to share the reference frame for the polarization
mode, which is one of the qualitative differences from
polarization encoding MIQKD scheme [9].
V. SECURITY PROOF
This section is devoted to the unconditional security
proof, i.e., the security proof against the most general
attacks, of our schemes. Since both of our schemes are
based on BB84 and the basis-dependent flaw in both pro-
tocols can be treated in the same manner, we can prove
the security in a unified manner.
If the states sent by Alice and Bob were basis indepen-
dent, i.e., the density matrices of X-basis and Y -basis
were the same, then the security proof of the original
BB84 [1–3] could directly apply (also see [21] for a bit
more detailed discussion of this proof), however they
are basis dependent in our case. Fortunately, security
proof of standard BB84 with basis-dependent flaw has
already been shown to be secure [12–14], and we general-
ize this idea to our case where we have basis-dependent
flaw from both of Alice and Bob. In order to do so, we
consider a virtual protocol [12–14, 22] that Alice and Bob
get together and the basis choices by Alice and Bob are
made via measurement processes on the so-called quan-
tum coin. In this virtual protocol of the phase encoding
scheme I, Alice and Bob prepare joint systems in the state
[23]
|Ψ′〉
≡ 1
2
(
|0z〉E |0z〉B |0z〉A
∣∣∣φ(+)x (|√αA〉)
〉 ∣∣∣φ(+)x (|√αB〉)
〉
+ |0z〉E |0z〉B |1z〉A
∣∣∣φ(+)y (|−i√αA〉)
〉 ∣∣∣φ(+)y (|−i√αB〉)
〉
+ |1z〉E |1z〉B |0z〉A
∣∣∣φ(+)x (|√αA〉)
〉 ∣∣∣φ(+)y (|−i√αB〉)
〉
+ |1z〉E |1z〉B |1z〉A
∣∣∣φ(+)y (|−i√αA〉)
〉 ∣∣∣φ(+)x (|√αB〉)
〉)
.
(3)
Since just replacing the state, for instance∣∣∣φ(+)x (∣∣√αA〉)
〉
→
∣∣∣φ(+)x (|1〉s |0〉r /√2 + |0〉s |1〉r /√2)
〉
where 1 and 0 in the ket respectively represents the
single-photon and the vacuum, is enough to apply the
following proof to the phase encoding scheme II, we
discuss only the security of the phase encoding scheme
I in what follows. In Eq. (3), the first system denoted
by E is given to Eve just after the preparation, and it
informs Eve of whether the bases to be used by Alice
and Bob match or not. The second system, denoted by
B, is a copy of the first system and this system is given
to Bob who measures this system with {|0z〉B , |1z〉B}
basis to know whether Alice’s and Bob’s bases match
or not. If his measurement outcome is |0z〉B (|1z〉B),
then he uses the same (the other) basis to be used by
Alice (note that no classical communication is needed
in order for Bob to know Alice’s basis since Alice and
Bob get together). The third system, which is denoted
by A and we call “ quantum coin”, is possessed and
to be measured by Alice along {|0z〉A , |1z〉A} basis
to determine her basis choice, and the measurement
outcome will be sent to Eve after Eve broadcasts
the measurement outcome at MU. Moreover, all the
second systems of
∣∣∣φ(+)x (√αA)
〉
,
∣∣∣φ(+)y (∣∣−i√αA〉)
〉
,∣∣∣φ(+)x (∣∣√αB〉)
〉
, and
∣∣∣φ(+)y (∣∣−i√αB〉)
〉
are sent to Eve.
Note in this formalism that the information, including
classical information and quantum information, available
to Eve is the same as those in the actual protocol, and
the generated key is also the same as the one of the
actual protocol since the statistics of Alice’s and Bob’s
raw data is exactly the same as the one of the actual
protocol. Thus, we are allowed to work on this virtual
protocol for the security proof.
The first system given to Eve in Eq. (3) allows her to
know which coherent pulses contain data in the sifted key
and she can post-select only the relevant pulses. Thus,
without the loss of any generalities of the security proof,
we can concentrate only on the post-selected version of
the state in Eq. (3) as
|Ψ〉 ≡ 1√
2
(
|0z〉A
∣∣∣φ(+)x (|√αA〉)
〉 ∣∣∣φ(+)x (|√αB〉)
〉
+ |1z〉A
∣∣∣φ(+)y (|−i√αA〉)
〉 ∣∣∣φ(+)y (|−i√αB〉)
〉)
. (4)
The most important quantity in the proof is the phase
error rate in the code bits. The definition of the phase
error rate is the rate of bit errors along Y -basis in the
sifted key if they had chosen Y -basis as the measurement
basis when both of them have sent pulses in X-basis. If
Alice and Bob have a good estimation of this rate as well
as the bit error rate in the sifted key (the bit error rate
in X-basis given Alice and Bob have chosen X-basis for
the state preparation), they can perform hashing in Y -
basis and X-basis simultaneously [17, 24] to distill pairs
of qubits in the state whose fidelity with respect to the
product state of the maximally entangled state |Ψ+〉 is
close to 1.
According to the discussion on the universal compos-
ability [26], the key distilled via X-basis measurement on
such a state is composably secure and moreover exactly
7the same key can be generated only by classical means,
i.e., error correction and privacy amplification [3]. Thus,
we are left only with the phase error estimation. For the
simplicity of the discussion, we assume the large number
of successful events n so that we neglect all the statistical
fluctuations and we are allowed to work on a probability
rather than the relative frequency.
The quantity we have to estimate is the bit er-
ror along Y -basis, denoted by δ′y, given Alice and
Bob send
∣∣∣φ(+)x (∣∣√αA〉)
〉 ∣∣∣φ(+)x (∣∣√αB〉)
〉
state, which
is different from the experimentally available bit er-
ror rate along Y -basis given Alice and Bob send∣∣∣φ(+)y (∣∣−i√αA〉)
〉 ∣∣∣φ(+)y (∣∣−i√αB〉)
〉
state. Intuitively, if
the basis-dependent flaw is very small, δ′y and δy should
be very close since the states are almost indistinguish-
able. To make this intuition rigorous, we briefly review
the idea by [13, 14] which applies Bloch sphere bound
[27] to the quantum coin. Suppose that we randomly
choose Z-basis or X-basis as the measurement basis for
each quantum coin. Let nγz/2 and nγx/2 be fraction that
those quantum coins result in 1 in Z-basis and X-basis
measurement, respectively. What Bloch sphere bound,
i.e., Eq. (13) or Eq. (14) in [27] or Eq. (A1) in [14],
tells us in our case is that no matter how the correla-
tions among the quantum coins are and no matter what
the state for the quantum coins is, thanks to the ran-
domly chosen bases, the following inequality holds with
probability exponentially close to 1 in n,
(1− 2γz)2 + (1− 2γx)2 ≤ 1 . (5)
By applying this bound separately to the quantum coins
that are conditional on having phase errors and to those
that are conditional on having no phase error, and fur-
thermore by combining those inequalities using Bayes’s
rule, we have
1− 2∆ ≤
√
δyδ′y +
√
(1 − δy)(1 − δ′y) . (6)
Here, ∆ is equivalent to the probability that the measure-
ment outcome of the quantum coin along X-basis is |1x〉
given the successful event in MU. Note that this proba-
bility can be enhanced by Eve who chooses carefully the
pulses, and Eve could attribute all the loss events to the
quantum coins being in the state |0x〉. Thus, we have an
upper bound of ∆ in the worst case scenario as
∆ ≤ ∆ini/γsuc , (7)
and
∆ini ≡
(
1−
〈
φ(+)x (|
√
αA〉)
∣∣∣φ(+)y (|−i√αA〉)
〉
×
〈
φ(+)x (|
√
αB〉)
∣∣∣φ(+)y (|−i√αB〉)
〉)
/2 , (8)
where γsuc is the frequency of the successful event.
Note that we have not used the explicit
form of |φ(±)x (β)〉 and |φ(±)y (β)〉, where β =
√
αA,−i√αA,√αB,−i√αB, in the derivation of Eqs.
(6), (7), and (8), and the important point is that the state
|φ(±)x (β)〉 and |φ(±)y (β)〉 are the purification of Alice’s
and Bob’s density matrices for both bases. Since there
always exists purification states of ρ(X) and ρ(Y ), which
are respectively denoted by
∣∣Ω(X)〉 and ∣∣Ω(Y )〉, such that〈
Ω(X)|Ω(Y )〉 = F (ρ(X), ρ(Y )) ≡ Tr(∣∣∣√ρ(X)√ρ(Y )
∣∣∣),
∆ini can be rewritten by
∆ini ≡
[
1− F
(
ρ
(X)
A , ρ
(Y )
A
)
F
(
ρ
(X)
B , ρ
(Y )
B
) ]
/2 , (9)
where ρ
(X)
A represents Alice’s density matrix of X basis
and all the other density matrices are defined by the same
manner. Our expression of ∆ini has the product of two
fidelities, while the standard BB84 with basis-dependent
flaw in [12–14] has only one fidelity (the fidelity between
Alice’s density matrices in X and Y bases). The two
products may lead to poor performance of our schemes
compared to that of standard QKD in terms of the
achievable distances, however our schemes have the huge
advantage over the standard QKD that there is no side-
channel in the detectors.
Finally, the key generation rate G, given X-basis, in
the asymptotic limit of large n is given by
G = γ(x)suc
(
1− f(δx)h(δx)− h(δ′y)
)
, (10)
where δx is the bit error rate in X-basis, f(δx) is the
inefficiency of the error correcting code, and h(x) ≡
−x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x). We can trivially obtain
the key generation rate for Y -basis just by interchang-
ing X-basis in all the discussions above to Y -basis. We
remark in our security proof that we have assumed noth-
ing about what kind of measurement MU conducts but
that it announces whether it detects the successful event
and the type of the event (this announcement allows us
to calculate γ
(x)
suc and the error rates). Thus, MU can be
assumed to be totally under the control of Eve.
VI. SIMULATION OF THE KEY GENERATION
RATES
In the following subsections, we show some examples
of the key generation rate of each of our schemes assum-
ing typical experimental parameters taken from Gobby-
Yuan-Shields (GYS) experiment [28] unless otherwise
stated. Moreover, we assume that the imperfect phase
modulation is the main source of the decay of the fidelity
between the density matrices in two bases, and we eval-
uate the effect of this imperfection on the key generation
rate.
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FIG. 4: The key generation rates of each setting as a function
of the distance between Alice and Bob with the alignment
error rate (eali) of 3.3% and 4.0%. Dashed line: (a) MU is
at Bob’s side, i.e., lB = 0. Solid line: (b) MU is just in the
middle between Alice and Bob. The lines achieving the longer
distances correspond to 3.3% of eali. See also the main text
for the explanation.
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FIG. 5: Optimal mean photon numbers emitted by Alice’s
source (αA) that outputs Fig. 4 as a function of the distance
between Alice and Bob.
A. Phase encoding scheme I
In the phase encoding scheme I, the important quantity
for the security ∆ini can be expressed as
∆ini =
1
2
[
1− e−(αA+αB)(cosαA + sinαA)
× (cosαB + sinαB)
]
. (11)
Note that this quantity is dependent on the intensity of
Alice’s and Bob’s sources. As we have mentioned in Sec.
III, this quantity may be estimated relatively easily via
tomography involving homodyne measurement.
To simulate the resulting key generation rate, we as-
sume that the bit error stems from the dark counting as
well as alignment errors due to imperfect phase locking
or imperfect optical components. The alignment error is
assumed to be proportional to the probability of having
a correct click caused only by the optical detection not
by the dark counting. Moreover, we make assumptions
that all the detectors have the same characteristics for
the simplicity of the analysis, and Alice and Bob choose
the intensities of the signal lights in such a way that the
intensities of the incoming pulses to MU are the same.
Finally, we assume the quantum inefficiency of the de-
tectors to be part of the losses in the quantum channels.
With all the assumptions, we may express the resulting
experimental parameters as
γ(x)suc = [pdark + (1 − pdark)(1 − e−2αin)](1− pdark)
+ (1 − pdark)e−2αinpdark
γsuc = γ
(x)
suc + γ
(y)
suc
δx = δy =
[
eali(1− pdark)2(1− e−2αin)
+ (1 − pdark)e−2αinpdark
]
/γ(x)suc
αin ≡ αAηA = αBηB
ηA = ηdet,A10
−ξAlA/10
ηB = ηdet,B10
−ξBlB/10 . (12)
Here, pdark is the dark count rate of the detector, eali
is the alignment error rate, ηA(ηB) is Alice’s (Bob’s)
overall transmission rate, ηdet,A (ηdet,B) is the quantum
efficiency of Alice’s (Bob’s) detector, ξA(ξB) is Alice’s
(Bob’s) channel transmission rate, and lA (lB) is the dis-
tance between Alice (Bob) and MU. The first term and
the second term in δx or δy respectively represent the
alignment error, which is assumed to be proportional to
the probability of having correct bit value due to the de-
tection of the light, and errors due to dark counting (one
detector clicks due to the dark counting while the other
one does not).
We take the following parameters from GYS experi-
ment [28]: f(δx) = 1.22, pdark = 8.5 × 10−7, ξ = 0.21
(dB/km), ηdet,A = ηdet,B = 0.045, and eali = 0.033, and
we simulate the key generation rate as a function of the
distance between Alice and Bob in Fig. 4. In the fig-
ure, we consider two settings: (a) MU is at Bob’s side,
i.e., lB = 0 (b) MU is just in the middle between Alice
and Bob. The reason why we consider these setting is
that the basis-dependent flaw is dependent on intensities
that Alice and Bob employ, and it is not trivial where we
should place MU for the better performance.
Since MDIQKD polarization encoding scheme without
basis-dependent flaw achieves almost twice the distance
of BB84 [9], we may expect that the setting (b) could
achieve almost twice the distance of BB84 without phase
randomization that achieves about 13 (km) [14] with the
same experimental parameters. The simulation result,
however, does not follow this intuition since we have the
basis-dependent flaw not only from Alice’s side but also
from Bob’s side. Thus, the advantage that we obtain
from putting MU between Alice and Bob is overwhelmed
by the double basis-dependent flaw. In each setting, we
have optimized the intensity of the coherent pulses αA
for each distance (see Fig. 5).
In order to explain why the optimal αA is so small,
note that scheme I intrinsically suffers from the basis-
dependent flaw due to Eq. (11). This means that if we
use relatively large αA, then we cannot generate the key
due to the flaw. Actually, when we set αA = 0.1, which
9is a typical order of the amplitude for decoy BB84, one
can see that the upper bound of the phase error rate is
1/2 even in the zero distance, i.e., l = 0, and we have no
chance to generate the key with this amplitude. Thus,
Alice and Bob have to reduce the intensities in order to
suppress the basis-dependent flaw. Also, as the distance
gets larger and the losses get increased, Alice and Bob
have to use weaker pulses since larger losses can be ex-
ploited by Eve to enhance the basis-dependent flaw ac-
cording to Eq. (7), and they can reduce the intensities
until it reaches the cut-off value where the detection of
the weak pulses is overwhelmed by the dark counts.
In the above simulation, we have assumed that Alice
and Bob can prepare states very accurately, however in
reality, they can only prepare approximate states due to
the imperfection of the sources. This imperfection gives
more basis-dependent flaw, and in order to estimate the
effect of this imperfection, we assume that the fidelity
between the two actually prepared density matrices in
two bases is approximated by the fidelity between the
following density matrices (see Appendix B for the detail)
ρ
(Act)
X (α, δ) =
(∣∣√α〉 〈√α∣∣+ ∣∣∣−ei|δ|√α〉〈−ei|δ|√α∣∣∣) /2
(13)
and
ρ
(Act)
Y (α, δ) =
( ∣∣∣iei|δ|/2√α〉〈iei|δ|/2√α
∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣−ie−i|δ|/2√α〉〈−ie−i|δ|/2√α∣∣∣ )/2 ,
(14)
where we assume an imperfect phase modulator whose
degree of the phase modulation error is proportional to
the target phase modulation value, and δ represents the
imperfection of the phase modulation that is related with
the extinction ratio ηex as
∣∣∣∣tan δ2
∣∣∣∣
2
= ηex . (15)
In this equation, we assume that the non-zero extinction
ratio is only due to the imperfection of the phase mod-
ulators. Since imperfect phase modulation results in the
same effect as the alignment errors, i.e., the pulses are
routed to a wrong output port, we assume that the align-
ment error rate is increased with this imperfection. Thus,
in the simulation accommodating the imperfection of the
phase modulation, we replace eali with eali+16ηex. Here,
we have used a pessimistic assumption that the effect of
the phase modulation becomes 16-times higher than be-
fore since each of Alice and Bob has one phase modulator
and MU has two phase modulators for the phase shift of
two polarization modes (note from Eq. (15) that ηex is
approximately proportional to δ2, thus 4 times degrada-
tion in terms of the accuracy of the phase modulation
results in 16-times degradation in terms of the extinction
ratio). We also remark that in practice, it is more likely
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FIG. 6: The key generation rates of the each setting as a
function of the distance between Alice and Bob with a base-
line alignment error rate (eali) of 3.3% and imperfect phase
modulators. δ0 = 0.063 represents the typical amount of the
phase modulation error, and we plot the key rate for smaller
imperfection of δ0/3 and δ0/5. Dashed line: MU is at Bob’s
side, i.e., lB = 0. Solid line: MU is just in the middle between
Alice and Bob.
that the phase encoding errors are independent, in which
case a factor of 4 will suffice and the key rate will actually
be higher than what is presented in our paper. On the
other hand, we have to use the following ∆ini when we
consider the security:
∆ini =
[
1− F (ρ(Act)X (αA, δ), ρ(Act)Y (αA, δ))
× F (ρ(Act)X (αB , δ), ρ(Act)Y (αB , δ))
]
/2 . (16)
In Figs. 6 and 7, we plot the key generation rate and
the corresponding optimal Alice’s mean photon numbers
(αA) as a function of the distance between Alice and
Bob. In the figures, we define |δ| that satisfies ηex =∣∣tan δ2 ∣∣2 = 10−3 as δ0(∼ 0.063), where ηex = 10−3 is
the typical order of ηex in some experiments [29]. We
have confirmed that we cannot generate the key when
ηex = 10
−3. However, we can see in the figures that if
the accuracy of the phase modulation is increased three
times or five times, i.e., δ = δ0/3 and δ = δ0/5, then
we can generate the key. Like the case in Fig. 5, the
small optimal mean photon number can be intuitively
understood by the arguments that we have already made
in this section.
In order to investigate the feasibility of the phase en-
coding scheme I with the current technologies, we replace
pdark = 8.5 × 10−7, ηdet,A = ηdet,B = 0.045, and eali =
0.033 with pdark = 1.0×10−7, ηdet,A = ηdet,B = 0.15 [30],
and eali = 0.0075 [9]. We see in Fig. 18 that the key gen-
eration is possible over much longer distances with those
parameters assuming the precise control of the intensi-
ties of the laser source. We also show the corresponding
optimal mean photon number αA in Fig. 19. We note
that thanks to the higher quantum efficiency, the suc-
cess probability becomes higher, following that Alice and
Bob can use larger mean photon number αA compared
to those in Figs. 7 and 19.
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FIG. 7: Optimal mean photon numbers emitted by Alice’s
source (αA) that outputs Fig. 6 as a function of the distance
between Alice and Bob.
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FIG. 8: The key generation rates of the each setting as a
function of the distance between Alice and Bob with the latest
parameters such as eali = 0.0075 with pdark = 1.0 × 10−7,
ηdet,A = ηdet,B = 0.15 [30], and δ0 = 0.063. Dashed line: MU
is at Bob’s side, i.e., lB = 0. Solid line: MU is just in the
middle between Alice and Bob.
B. Phase encoding scheme II
In the phase encoding scheme II, note that we can gen-
erate the key only from the successful detection event in
MU given both of Alice and Bob send out a single-photon
since if either or both of Alice and Bob emit more than
one photon, then Eve can employ the so-called photon
number splitting attack [31]. Thus, the important quan-
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FIG. 9: Optimal mean photon numbers emitted by Alice’s
source (αA) that outputs Fig. 18 as a function of the distance
between Alice and Bob.
tities to estimate are Q
(1,1)
x , δ
(1,1)
y , δx, Qx, which respec-
tively represents gain in X-basis given both of Alice and
Bob emit a single-photon, the phase error rate given Al-
ice and Bob emit a single-photon, overall bit error rate in
X-basis, and overall gain in X-basis. To estimate these
quantities stemming from the simultaneous single-photon
emission, we assume the use of infinite number of decoy
states for the simplicity of analysis [20]. Another im-
portant quantity in our study is the fidelity F
(1)
A (F
(1)
B )
between Alice’s (Bob’s) X-basis and Y -basis density ma-
trices of only single-photon component, not whole optical
modes. If this fidelity is given, then we have
∆
(1,1)
ini =
1
2
(
1− F (1)A F (1)B
)
. (17)
For the simplicity of the discussion, we consider the case
of F
(1)
A = F
(1)
B ≡ F (1) in our simulation. The estimation
of the fidelity only in the single-photon part is very im-
portant, however to the best of our knowledge we do not
know any experiment directly measuring this quantity.
This measurement may require photon number resolv-
ing detectors and very accurate interferometers. Thus,
we again assume that the degradation of the fidelity is
only due to the imperfect phase modulation given by Eq.
(15), and we presume that the fidelity of the two den-
sity matrices between the two bases is approximated by
the fidelity between the following density matrices (see
Appendix B for the detail)
ρ
(1)
X =
1
2
[
Pˆ
( |0z〉+ |1z〉√
2
)
+ Pˆ
( |0z〉 − ei|δ| |1z〉√
2
)]
ρ
(1)
Y =
1
2
[
Pˆ
( |0z〉+ iei|δ|/2 |1z〉√
2
)
+ Pˆ
( |0z〉 − ie−i|δ|/2 |1z〉√
2
)]
. (18)
With these parameters, we can express the key genera-
tion rate given Alice and Bob use X-basis as [12]
G = Q(1,1)x
[
1− h(δ(1,1)′y )
]
− f(δx)Qxh(δx) , (19)
where δ
(1,1)′
y is the (1, 1) version of δ′y in Eq. (10).
To simulate the resulting key generation rate, the bit
errors are assumed to stem from multi-photon compo-
nent, the dark counting, and the misalignment that is
assumed to be proportional to the probability of obtain-
ing the correct bit values only due to the detection by
optical pulses. Like before, we also assume that all the
detectors have the same characteristics, Alice and Bob
choose the intensities of the signal lights in such a way
that the intensities of the incoming pulses to MU are the
same, and all the quantum inefficiencies of the detectors
can be attributed to part of the losses in the quantum
channel. Finally, Alice’s and Bob’s coherent light sources
are assumed to be phase randomized, and the imperfect
phase modulation is represented by the increase of the
11
alignment error rate. With these assumptions, we may
have the following resulting experimental parameters
Q(1,1)x = 4αAαBηAηBe
−2(αA+αB)
×
[ (1− pdark)2
2
+
pdark(1 − pdark)2
2
]
+ W (2,1) +W (2,0)
δ(1,1)x =
{
4αAαBηAηBe
−2(αA+αB)pdark(1− pdark)2/2
+ 2(eali + 4ηex)αAαBηAηBe
−2(αA+αB)(1− pdark)2
+ (W (2,1) +W (2,0))/2
}
/Q(1,1)x
Q(1,1)y = Q
(1,1)
x
δ(1,1)y = δ
(1,1)
x
W (2,1) ≡ 8αAαBe−2(αA+αB)
[
ηA(1− ηB) + (1− ηA)ηB
]
× pdark(1− pdark)2
W (2,0) ≡ 16αAαB(1− ηA)(1 − ηB)e−2(αA+αB)
× p2dark(1− pdark)2
Qx = 2
[
1− (1− pdark)e−αin
]2
(1− pdark)2e−2αin + V
δx = V + (eali + 4ηex)2
(
1− e−αin)2
× (1− pdark)2e−2αin
V ≡ pdark(1− pdark)
2π
×
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
[
1− (1− pdark)e−αin|1+e
iθ|2
]
×
[
(1 − pdark)e−αin|1−e
iθ|2
]
+
pdark(1− pdark)
2π
×
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
[
1− (1− pdark)e−αin|1−e
iθ|2
]
×
[
(1 − pdark)e−αin|1+e
iθ|2
]
αin ≡ αAηA = αBηB
ηA = ηdet,A10
−ξAlA/10/2
ηB = ηdet,B10
−ξBlB/10/2 (20)
Note that αA (αB) represents each of the intensity of Al-
ice’s (Bob’s) signal light and the reference light, not the
total intensity of them, and ηA and ηB are divided by
2 since the conversion efficiency of our converter is 50%.
4 in 4ηex again comes from the pessimistic assumption
that each of Alice’s and Bob’s phase modulator is imper-
fect, andW (2,1) (W (2,0)) represents the probability of the
event where both of Alice and Bob emit a single-photon
and only one (zero) photon is detected but the successful
detection event is obtained due to the dark counting. On
the other hand, the quantity that quantifies the basis-
dependent flaw ∆ in the present case is upper bounded
by
∆ ≤ ∆(1,1)ini /
[
Q(1,1)/(4αAαBe
−2(αA+αB))
]
Q(1,1) ≡ (Q(1,1)x +Q(1,1)y )/2 (21)
where Q(1,1)/4αAαBe
−2(αA+αB) is the probability that
MU receives a single-photon both from Alice and Bob
simultaneously conditioned on that each of Alice and Bob
sends out a single-photon. We remark that ∆ini in this
scheme is only dependent on the accuracy of the phase
modulation. This is different from scheme I where the
manipulation of the intensities of the pulses can affect
the basis-dependent flaw.
In the simulation, we again assume GYS experimental
parameters and we consider two settings: (a) MU is at
Bob’s side and (b) MU is just in the middle between Alice
and Bob. Note that ∆ini is independent of αA and αB in
the phase encoding scheme II case.
In Fig. 10, we plot the key generation rates of (a) and
(b) for δ = 0, δ = δ0/50, δ = δ0/20, δ = δ0/10 (re-
call from Eq. (15) that δ0 ∼ 0.0063224 that corresponds
to the typical extinction ratio of 0.1%), which respec-
tively correspond to F (1) = 1.0, F (1) ∼ 1 − 1.0 × 10−7,
F (1) ∼ 1 − 6.6 × 10−7, and F (1) ∼ 1 − 2.5 × 10−6, and
the achievable distances of (a) and (b) increase with the
improvement of the accuracy, i.e., with the decrease of
δ. We have confirmed that no key can be distilled in
(a) and (b) when δ ≥ δ0/7. The figure shows that the
achievable distance drops significantly with the degra-
dation of the accuracy of the phase modulator, and the
main reason of this fast decay is that ∆ is approximated
by ∆ini/O(ηAηB) and this dominator decreases exponen-
tially with the increase of the distance.
We also plot the corresponding optimal αA in Fig.
11. Notice that the mean photon number increases in
some regime in some cases of (a), and recall that this
increase does not change ∆ini. If we increased the inten-
sity in scheme I with the distance, then we would have
more basis-dependent flaw, resulting in shortening of the
achievable distance. This may be an intuitive reason why
we see no such increase in Figs. 5, 7, and 9.
Like in the phase encoding scheme I, we investigate the
feasibility of the phase encoding scheme II with the cur-
rent technologies by replacing pdark = 8.5×10−7, ηdet,A =
ηdet,B = 0.045, and eali = 0.033 with pdark = 1.0× 10−7,
ηdet,A = ηdet,B = 0.15 [30], and eali = 0.0075 [9]. With
this upgrade, we have confirmed the impossibility of the
key generation, however if we double the quantum effi-
ciency of the detector or equivalently, if we assume the
polarization encoding so that the factor of 1/2, which is
introduced by the phase-to-polarization converter, is re-
moved both from ηA and ηB in Eq. (20), then we can
generate the key, which is shown in Fig. 12 (also see Fig.
13).
Finally, we note that our simulation is essentially the
same as the polarization coding since the fact that we
use phase encoding is only reflected by the dominator
of 2 in ηA and ηB in Eq. (20). Thus, the behavior of
12
0 50 100 150 200
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
Distance HkmL
lo
g 1
0G
FIG. 10: The key generation rates of each setting as a function
of the distance. Dashed line: (a) MU is at Bob’s side, i.e.,
lB = 0. Solid line: (b) MU is just in the middle between Alice
and Bob. We plot the key generation rates of each case when
δ = 0, δ = δ0/50, δ = δ0/20, δ = δ0/10 where δ is proportional
to the amount of the phase modulation error, and for each
case of (a) and (b) the key generation rates monotonously
increase with the decrease of δ., i.e., with the improvement
of the phase modulation. The key rates of (a) and (b) when
δ0/10 are almost superposed. See also the main text for the
explanation.
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FIG. 11: The optimal mean photon number emitted by Alice
(αA) that outputs Fig. 10. The bold lines correspond to (a).
See also the main text for the explanation.
the key generation rate against the degradation of the
state preparation is the same also in polarization based
MDIQKD. Also note that even in the standard BB84,
∆ decays exponentially with increasing distance. Thus,
we conclude that very precise state preparation is very
crucial in the security of not only MDIQKD but also in
standard QKD. We also note that our estimation of the
fidelity might be too pessimistic since we have assumed
that the degradation of the extinction ratio is only due
to imperfect phase modulation. In reality, the imperfec-
tion of Mach-Zehnder interferometer and other imper-
fections should contribute to the degradation, and the
fidelity should be closer to 1 than the one based on our
model.
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FIG. 12: The key generation rates of each setting as a function
of the distance with pdark = 1.0 × 10−7, ηdet,A = ηdet,B =
0.30, and δ0 = 0.063. Note that we double ηdet,A = ηdet,B
compared to the one of [30], or we effectively consider the
polarization encoding [9]. Dashed line: (a) MU is at Bob’s
side, i.e., lB = 0. Solid line: (b) MU is just in the middle
between Alice and Bob. The key rates are almost superposed.
See also the main text for the explanation.
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FIG. 13: The optimal mean photon number emitted by Alice
(αA) that outputs Fig. 12. The bold lines correspond to (a).
See also the main text for the explanation.
VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In summary, we have proposed two phase encoding
MDIQKD schemes. The first scheme is based on the
phase locking technique and the other one is based on
the conversion of the pulses in the standard phase en-
coding BB84 to polarization modes. We proved the se-
curity of the first scheme, which intrinsically possesses
basis-dependent flaw, as well as the second scheme with
the assumption of the basis-dependent flaw in the single-
photon part of the pulses. Based on the security proof,
we also evaluate the effect of imperfect state preparation,
and especially we focus our attention to the imperfect
phase modulation.
While the first scheme can cover relatively short dis-
tances of the key generation, this scheme has an advan-
tage that the basis-dependent flaw can be controlled by
the intensities of the pulses. Thanks to this property,
we have confirmed based on a simple model that 3 or 5
times of the improvement in the accuracy of the phase
modulation is enough to generate the key. Moreover, we
have confirmed that the key generation is possible even
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FIG. 14: The key generation rates of the standard BB84 with
infinite decoy states from X-basis when δ = 0, δ = δ0, δ = 2δ0
where δ is the amount of the phase modulation error.
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FIG. 15: The optimal mean photon number emitted by Alice
(αA) that outputs Fig. 14.
without these improvements if we implement this scheme
by using the up-to-date technologies and the control of
intensities of the laser source is precise. On the other
hand, it is not so clear to us how accurate we can lock
the phase of two spatially separated laser sources, which
is important for the performance of scheme I. Our result
still implies that scheme I can tolerate up to some extent
of the imperfect phase locking errors, which should be ba-
sically the same as the misalignment errors, but further
analysis of the accuracy from the experimental viewpoint
is necessary. We leave this problem for the future studies.
The second scheme can cover much longer distances
when the fidelity of the single-photon components of Y -
basis andX-basis density matrices is perfect or extremely
close to perfect. When we consider the slight degrada-
tions of the fidelity, however, we found that the achiev-
able distances drop significantly. This suggests that we
need a photon source with a very high fidelity, and very
accurate estimation of the fidelity of the single-photon
subspace is also indispensable.
In our estimation of the imperfection of the phase mod-
ulation, we simply assume that the degradation of the ex-
tinction ratio is only due to imperfect phase modulation,
which might be too pessimistic, and the imperfection
of Mach-Zehnder interferometer and other imperfections
contribute to the degradation. Thus, the actual fidelity
between the density matrices of the single-photon part
in two bases might be very close to 1, which should be
experimentally confirmed for the secure communication.
We note that the use of the passive device to prepare the
state [32] may be a promising way for the very accurate
state preparation.
We remark that the accurate preparation of the state
is very important not only in MDIQKD but also in stan-
dard QKD where Eve can enhance the imbalance of the
quantum coin exponentially with the increase of the dis-
tance. To see this point, we respectively plot in Fig.
14 and Fig. 15 the key generation rate of standard
BB84 with infinite decoy states in X-basis and its op-
timal mean photon number assuming pdark = 1.0× 10−7,
ηdet,A = 0.15 [30], eali = 0.0075, f(δx) = 1.22, and
ξ = 0.21. Again, δ0 ∼ 0.063 is the typical value of the
phase modulation error, and we see in the figure that the
degradation of the phase modulator in terms of the ac-
curacy significantly decreases the achievable distance of
secure key generation. One notices that standard decoy
BB84 is more robust against the degradation since the
probability that the measurement outcome of the quan-
tum coin along X-basis is |1x〉 given the successful detec-
tion of the signal by Bob is written as ∆ini =
1
2 (1−F
(1)
A )
rather than ∆ini =
1
2 (1 − F
(1)
A F
(1)
B ). On the other hand,
one has to remember that we trust the operation of Bob’s
detectors in this simulation, which may not hold in prac-
tice.
Finally, we neglect the effect of the fluctuation of the
intensity and the center frequency of the laser light in
our study, which we will analyze in the future works. In
summary, our work highlights the importance of very ac-
curate preparation of the states to avoid basis-dependent
flaws.
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Appendix A: Scheme I without noises and losses
In this appendix, we give a detailed calculation about
how scheme I works when there is no channel losses
and noises. In order to calculate the joint probability
that Alice and Bob obtain type-0 successful event, where
only the detector D0 clicks, and they share the max-
imally entangled state |Ψ+〉, we introduce a projector
ΠˆD0 ≡ Pˆ
(∣∣0〉
D0
)
Pˆ
(|0〉D1
)
that corresponds to type-
0 successful event. Here, 0 represents the non-vacuum
state. The state after Alice and Bob have the type-0
successful event ΠˆD0 |ζ〉A1,B1,D0,D1 (see Eq. (2) for the
definition of |ζ〉A1,B1,D0,D1) can be expressed by
1ˆA1,B1ΠˆD0 |ζ〉A1,B1,D0,D1 =
a√
2
∣∣Φ+〉
A1,B1
|φ0〉D0 |0〉D1
+
b√
2
∣∣Ψ+〉
A1,B1
|φ1〉D0 |0〉D1 .
(A1)
Here, 1ˆA1,B1 is an identity operator on A1 and B1, a and
b are complex numbers, and |φ0〉 and |φ1〉 are orthonor-
mal bases, which are related with each other through
Pˆ
(∣∣0〉) ∣∣∣√2α′〉 ≡ a |φ0〉+ b |φ1〉
Pˆ
(∣∣0〉) ∣∣∣−√2α′〉 ≡ a |φ0〉 − b |φ1〉 . (A2)
By a direct calculation, one can show that
|a|2 = (1− e
−2α′)2
2
|b|2 = (1− e
−4α′)
2
. (A3)
Finally, by taking the partial trace over the system D0
and D1 in Eq. (A1), we can see that Alice and Bob
share either |Φ+〉 or |Ψ+〉 probabilistically, and the joint
probability that they obtain type-0 successful event and
share the maximally entangled state |Ψ+〉 is given by
|b|2/2. In the same manner, we can readily calculate the
other joint probabilities.
Appendix B: Imperfection of the phase modulator
In this appendix, we give an estimation of the fidelity
between the density matrices in X and Y bases by using
the extinction ratio. In this estimation, we assume that
the source of the imperfections is only due to the imper-
fect phase modulation and the stability of the intensity
control of the coherent light source is negligible.
Imagine that we generate two pulses, one of which is
the reference light and the other one of which is the signal
light, and these pulses are spatially separated. Then, we
input these pulses into a Mach-Zehnder interferometer,
which is composed of two 50:50 beam splitters, and the
output from one of the two output ports gives us the
desired state and the other output port gives a wrong
state. Let T and t be transmission rates of the pulses to
the correct port and the wrong port, which satisfies
T + t = 1
ηex ≡ t
T
, (B1)
where ηex is the extinction ratio. In typical experiments,
ηex is in the order of 10
−3 [29]. We assume that the Mach-
Zehnder interferometer is perfect and the imperfection
of the extinction ratio is only due to imperfect phase
modulations.
Now, suppose that we plug |√α〉 and
∣∣ei(pi+δ)√α〉 into
the perfect Mach-Zehnder interferometer, where δ repre-
sents the imperfect the phase modulation when we want
to apply phase shift of π. Since Mach-Zehnder interfer-
ometer is composed of 50:50 beam splitters, ηex can be
represented by
∣∣tan δ2 ∣∣2, and thus we can obtain the im-
perfection of δ by solving the following equation
∣∣∣∣tan δ2
∣∣∣∣
2
= ηex . (B2)
For instance, when ηex = 10
−3, we have |δ| ∼ 0.063 ≡ δ0
that is equivalent to about 3.62 degrees. We rely on this
equation to estimate the accuracy of the phase modula-
tor, and we assume that the actual phase modulation is
θ+ |δ|θ/π, i.e., the degree of the imperfect phase modula-
tion is proportional to the desired phase modulation. We
remark that 3.62 degrees seem rather large to us, and we
believe that this can be substantially improved through
careful calibration and/or engineering of the preparation
process.
In the case of scheme I, the ideal density matrix for X
basis ρ
(Ideal)
X is (|α〉 〈α|+ |−α〉 〈−α|)/2 and the one for Y
basis ρ
(Ideal)
Y is (|iα〉 〈iα|+ |−iα〉 〈−iα|)/2. Based on our
imperfect phase modulation model, we have the density
matrix for the actually generated states in X basis as
ρ
(Act)
X (α, δ) =
(∣∣√α〉 〈√α∣∣+ ∣∣−eiδ√α〉 〈−eiδ√α∣∣) /2
(B3)
and the one for Y basis as
ρ
(Act)
Y (α, δ) =
( ∣∣∣iei|δ|/2√α〉〈iei|δ|/2√α∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣−ie−i|δ|/2√α〉〈−ie−i|δ|/2√α
∣∣∣ )/2 .
(B4)
Here, note that when we want to prepare |√α〉, we do
not apply any phase modulation.
In the case of scheme II, the ideal single-photon den-
sity matrix for X basis ρ
(Ideal,1)
X is (|0x〉 〈0x|+ |1x〉 〈1x|)/2
and the one for Y basis ρ
(Ideal,1)
Y is (|0y〉 〈0y|+|1y〉 〈1y|)/2.
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With the assumption on the accuracy of the phase mod-
ulator, we have the density matrix for the actually gen-
erated states in X basis as
ρ
(Act,1)
X =
(
Pˆ
[
(|0z〉+ |1z〉)/
√
2
]
+ Pˆ
[
(|0z〉 − ei|δ| |1z〉)/
√
2
] )
/2 (B5)
and the one for Y basis as
ρ
(Act,1)
Y =
(
Pˆ
[
(|0z〉+ iei|δ|/2 |1z〉)/
√
2
]
+ Pˆ
[
(|0z〉 − ie−i|δ|/2 |1z〉)/
√
2
] )
/2 . (B6)
Appendix C: Erratum: Phase encoding schemes for
measurement device independent quantum key
distribution and basis-dependent flaw [Phys. Rev. A
85, 042307 and arXiv:1111.3413]
We would like to correct Eq. (9) in our paper and,
subsequently, modify figures for the key generation rates.
These corrections do not affect the validity of the main
conclusions reported in the paper. The correct form of
Eq. (9) in our paper [K. Tamaki, H-K. Lo, C-H. F.
Fung, and B. Qi, Phys. Rev. A 85, 042307 (2012) and
arXiv:1111.3413] should be
∆ini ≡ Min
(
∆
(A)
ini ,∆
(B)
ini
)
, (C1)
where
∆
(A)
ini ≡
[
1−Max
θ,ξ
(A)
Y
,ξ
(A)
X
Re
(
eiθ
〈
Ψ
(A)
Y,ξ
(A)
Y
∣∣∣Ψ(A)
X,ξ
(A)
X
〉)
× F
(
ρ
(X)
B , ρ
(Y )
B
) ]
/2
(C2)
or
∆
(B)
ini ≡
[
1−Max
θ,ξ
(B)
Y
,ξ
(B)
X
Re
(
eiθ
〈
Ψ
(B)
Y,ξ
(B)
Y
∣∣∣Ψ(B)
X,ξ
(B)
X
〉)
× F
(
ρ
(X)
A , ρ
(Y )
A
) ]
/2 .
(C3)
Here, 0 ≤ θ < 2π, 0 ≤ ξ(A)W < 2π, and 0 ≤ ξ(B)W < 2π,
and
∣∣∣∣Ψ(A)W,ξ(A)
W
〉
is defined by
∣∣∣∣Ψ(A)W,ξ(A)
W
〉
=
1√
2
(
|0W 〉Aq
∣∣∣χ(A)0W
〉
+ eiξ
(A)
W |1W 〉Aq
∣∣∣χ(A)1W
〉)
,
(C4)
where
∣∣∣χ(A)iW
〉
is a purification of ρ
(A)
iW , which is the state
that Alice actually prepares for the bit value i in basis
W (= X,Y), and Aq is Alice’s qubit system. One can
choose any purification for
∣∣∣χ(A)iW
〉
, and in particular it
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FIG. 16: The revised figure for Fig. 8 in our paper.
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FIG. 17: The revised figure for Fig. 9 in our paper.
should be chosen in such a way that it maximizes the
inner product in Eq. (C2) or (C3). One can similarly
define
∣∣∣∣Ψ(B)W,ξ(B)
W
〉
, and θ is introduced via considering a
joint state involving the quantum coin as
∣∣Ψθ,ξ(A),ξ(B)〉 ≡ 1√
2
(
|0z〉C
∣∣∣∣Ψ(A)X,ξ(A)
X
〉 ∣∣∣∣Ψ(B)X,ξ(B)
X
〉
+ eiθ |1z〉C
∣∣∣∣Ψ(A)Y,ξ(A)
Y
〉 ∣∣∣∣Ψ(B)Y,ξ(B)
Y
〉)
.(C5)
Due to this change, the figures for the key generation rate
have to be revised. As the examples of revised figures, we
show the revised version of Figs. 8, 9, 12, and 13, which
are the most important figures for our main conclusions
to hold. Notice that there are only minor changes in
Figs. 8 and 9 and the changes in Figs. 12 and 13 are
relatively big. However, the big changes do not affect
the validity of the main conclusions in our paper, which
is the importance of the state preparation in MDIQKD
and the fact that our schemes can generate the key with
the practical channel mode that we have assumed.
Justification of Eq. (C1)
For the derivation of Eq. (C1), we invoke Koashi’s
proof [33]. To apply Koashi’s proof, it is important to en-
sure that i) one of the two parties holds a virtual *qubit*
(rather than a higher dimensional system) and ii) the
fictitious measurements performed on the virtual qubit
have to form *conjugate* observables. Therefore, it is
not valid to consider fidelity alone (which allows arbi-
trary purifications that may not satisfy the conjugate
16
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FIG. 18: The revised figure for Fig. 12 in our paper. Two
lines are superposed.
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FIG. 19: The revised figure for Fig. 13 in our paper. Two
lines are superposed.
observables requirement). Fortunately, it turns out to
be easy to modify our equation to satisfy the above two
requirements.
Since the difference between Eq. (C2) and Eq. (C3)
comes from whether we consider Alice’s virtual qubit or
Bob’s virtual qubit, we focus only on Eq. (C2) and the
same argument holds for Eq. (C3). In Koashi’s proof,
the security is guaranteed via two alternative tasks, (i)
agreement on X (key distillation basis) and (ii) Alice’s
or Bob’s preparation of an eigenstate of Y, the conjugate
basis of X, with use of an extra communication channel.
The problem with the original (i.e. uncorrected) version
of Eq. (9) is the following. If we use the uncorrected
version of Eq. (9) in our paper, then the use of the fidelity
means that the real part in Eq. (C2) is equivalent to∣∣∣〈Ψ(A)Y,0
∣∣∣ (UAq ⊗ 1
∣∣∣Ψ(A)X,0
〉)∣∣∣ with the maximization over
all possible local unitary operators UAq. In this case,
if Alice performs a measurement along X basis, then it
violates the correspondence between her sending state
ρ
(A)
iW and her qubit state |iW 〉Aq in general, and thus,
in the uncorrected version of Eq. (9) in our paper, the
argument based on the fidelity does not guarantee the
security of the protocol. In contrast, with the corrected
version of Eq. (9) in our paper, since the maximization
over θ and ξ
(A)
W in Eq. (C2) preserves the relationship
between Alice’s sending state and her qubit state as well
as the conjugate relationship between X and Y, we can
apply Koashi’s proof for the security argument of the
protocol.
We thank X. B.Wang [34] for raising the concern about
the validity of Eq. (9) in our paper.
[1] D. Mayers, J. ACM 48 (3), pp. 351-406 (2001).
[2] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Science 283, 2050 (1999).
[3] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, pp. 441-
444 (2000).
[4] B. Qi, C.-H. F. Fung, H.-K. Lo and X. Ma, Quant. Inf.
Comp. 7, pp. 73-82 (2007), Y. Zhao, C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi,
C. Chen and H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 78, 042333 (2008),
C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi, K. Tamaki and H.-K. Lo, Phys.
Rev. A 75, 032314 (2007), F. Xu, B. Qi and H.-K. Lo,
New J. Phys. 12, 113026 (2010).
[5] L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J.
Skaar and V. Makarov, Nature Photonics 4, pp. 686-
689 (2010), Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes and A. J. Shields,
Nature Photonics 4, pp. 800-801 (2010), L. Lydersen,
C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar and V.
Makarov, Nature Photonics 4, 801 (2010), I. Gerhardt,
Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer and V.
Makarov, Nature Comm. 2, 349 (2011), L. Lydersen, M.
K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar and V. Makarov,
Arxiv: 1106.2396.
[6] C.-H. F. Fung, K. Tamaki, B. Qi, H.-K. Lo and X. Ma,
Quant. Inf. Comp. 9, 131 (2009), L. Lydersen, J. Skaar,
Quant. Inf. Comp. 10, 0060 (2010), Ø. Marøy, L. Lyder-
sen, J. Skaar, Phys. Rev. A 82, 032337 (2010).
[7] D. Mayers and A. C.-C. Yao, in Proceedings of the 39th
Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
(FOCS98), (IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC,
1998), p. 503, A. Acin, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, S. Massar,
S. Pironio, and V. Scarani, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 230501
(2007).
[8] J. Bell, Physics 1, 195 (1964).
[9] H-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, Arxiv: 1109.1473 (to be
published in Phys. Rev. Lett).
[10] H. Inamori, Algorithmica 34, pp. 340-365 (2002).
[11] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett., 67, no. 6, 5 August, pp.
661 -663 (1991).
[12] D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and J. Preskill,
Quantum Information and Computation 5, 325 (2004).
[13] M. Koashi, New J. Phys. 11 No 4 (April 2009) 045018
(12pp), e-print quant-ph/0505108 (2005).
[14] H-K. Lo, and J. Preskill, Quant. Inf. Comput. 8 pp. 431-
458 (2007).
[15] The definition of the four Bell state is as fol-
lows.
∣∣Ψ+〉 ≡ 1√
2
[|0z〉A1 |1z〉B1 + |1z〉A1 |0z〉B1] =
1√
2
[|0x〉A1 |0x〉B1 − |1x〉A1 |1x〉B1],
∣∣Φ−〉 ≡
1√
2
[|0z〉A1 |0z〉B1 − |1z〉A1 |1z〉B1] = 1√2 [|0x〉A1 |1x〉B1 +
|1x〉A1 |0x〉B1],
∣∣Φ+〉 ≡ 1√
2
[|0z〉A1 |0z〉B1 +
17
|1z〉A1 |1z〉B1] = 1√2 [|0x〉A1 |0x〉B1 + |1x〉A1 |1x〉B1],
and
∣∣Ψ−〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|0z〉A1 |1z〉B1 − |1z〉A1 |0z〉B1) =
1√
2
(|0x〉A1 |1x〉B1 − |1x〉A1 |0x〉B1).
[16] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of IEEE
International Conference on Computers, Systems, and
Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE Press, New
York, 1984), pp. 175-179.
[17] C. H. Bennett, D. P. DiVincenzo, J. A. Smolin, and W.
K. Wootters, Phys. Rev. A 54, 3824 (1996).
[18] In the case of Y -basis, we replace the fol-
lowing discussion with the one starting with∣∣∣φ(+)y (|−i√αA〉)
〉 ∣∣∣φ(+)y (|−i√αB〉)
〉
instead of∣∣∣φ(+)x (|√αA〉)
〉 ∣∣∣φ(+)x (|√αB〉)
〉
. See Eq. (1) for the
definition of the state.
[19] S. L. Braunstein, Phy. Rev. A 42, 474 (1990), W. Vogel
and J. Grabow, Phys. Rev. A 47, 4227 (1993). D. T.
Smithey, M. Beck, and M. G. Raymer, Phys. Rev. Lett.
70, 1244 (1993).
[20] W.-Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003), H.-
K. Lo, X. Ma and K. Chen, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230504
(2005), X.-B. Wang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503 (2005).
[21] One of the most simplest proofs is Shor-Preskill’s proof
[3]. The intuition of this proof is as follows. Note that if
Alice and Bob share some pairs of
∣∣Ψ+〉, (i.e., Alice has
one half of each pair and Bob has the other half), then
they can generate a secure key by performing X-basis
measurement. The reason of the security is that this state
is a pure state, which means that this state has no cor-
relations with the third system including Eve’s system.
Due to the intervention by Eve, Alice and Bob do not
share this pure state in general, but instead they share
noisy pairs. The basic idea of the proof is to consider the
distillation of
∣∣Ψ+〉 from the noisy pairs.
For the distillation, note that
∣∣Ψ+〉 is only one qubit pair
state that has no bit errors in X-basis (we call this error
as the bit error) and has no bit errors in Y -basis (we call
this error as the phase error). It is known that if Alice and
Bob employ the so-called CSS code (Calderbank-Shor-
Steane code) [25], then the noisy pairs are projected to a
classical mixture of the four Bell states, i.e.,
∣∣Ψ+〉, ∣∣Φ+〉
(
∣∣Ψ+〉 with the phase error), ∣∣Ψ−〉 (∣∣Ψ+〉 with the bit er-
ror), and
∣∣Φ−〉 (∣∣Ψ+〉 with both the phase and bit errors).
Moreover, if Alice and Bob choose a correct CSS code,
which can be achieved by random sampling procedure,
then CSS code can detect the position of the erroneous
pair with high probability. Thus, by performing bit and
phase flip operation depending on the detected error po-
sitions, Alice and Bob can distill some qubit pairs that
are very close in fidelity to the product state of
∣∣Ψ+〉.
In general, implementation of the above scheme requires
a quantum computer. Fortunately, Shor-Preskill showed
that the bit error detection and bit flip operation can be
done classically, and the phase error detection and phase
flip operation need not be done, but exactly the same key
can be obtained by the privacy amplification, so that we
do not need to possess a quantum computer for the key
distillation.
[22] S. L. Braunstein, S. Pirandola, ArXiv:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1109.2330
[23] We have chosen
∣∣∣φ(+)y (|−i√αA〉)
〉 ∣∣∣φ(+)y (|−i√αB〉)
〉
rather than
∣∣∣φ(+)y (i√αA)
〉 ∣∣∣φ(+)y (i√αB)
〉
to maximize the
inner product with
∣∣∣φ(+)x (|√αA〉)
〉 ∣∣∣φ(+)x (|√αB〉)
〉
. This
large inner product is important for the security proof.
[24] K. Tamaki, and G. Kato, Phys. Rev. A 81, 022316
(2010).
[25] A. R. Calderbank and P.W. Shor, Phys. Rev. A 54, 1098
(1996); A.M. Steane, Proc. R. Soc. London A 452, 2551
(1996).
[26] R. Renner, and R. Koenig, Proc. of TCC 2005, LNCS,
Springer, vol. 3378 (2005), M. Ben-Or, and Dominic
Mayers, arXiv:quant-ph/0409062, M. Ben-Or, Michal
Horodecki, D. W. Leung, D. Mayers, J. Oppenheim, The-
ory of Cryptography: Second Theory of Cryptography
Conference, TCC 2005, J.Kilian (ed.) Springer Verlag
2005, vol. 3378 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pp. 386-406.
[27] K. Tamaki, M. Koashi, and N. Imoto, Phys. Rev. Lett.
90, 167904 (2003).
[28] C. Gobby, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, Appl. Phys.
Lett. 84, 3762 (2004).
[29] T. Honjo, K. Inoue, and H. Takahashi, Opt. Lett. 29, 23
(2004). G. Li Advances in Optics and Photonics 1, 279
(2009).
[30] See NTT-NICT system in M. Sasaki, M. Fujiwara, H.
Ishizuka, et al, Optics Express Vol. 19, Iss. 11, 10387
(2011).
[31] G. Brassard, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, T. Mor, and B.C. Sanders,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 1330 (2000).
[32] M. Curty, M. Jofre, V. Pruneri, and M. W. Mitchell,
arXiv:1108.0841, M. Curty, X. Ma, H-K. Lo, N.
Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A 82, 052325 (2010).
[33] M. Koashi, arXiv:0704.3661 (2007). M. Koashi, New
J. Phys. 11 No 4 (April 2009) 045018 (12pp), e-print
quant-ph/0505108 (2005).
[34] X-B. Wang, arXiv:1207.0392 (2012).
